It all began with Greece. Having thought long and hard about it over the summer of 2011, Chancellor Angela Merkel had come to a decision: despite heavy pressure from her own CDU party and its Bavarian sister CSU, she was not going to kick Greece out of the monetary union. Instead Merkel dragged her partners along in the attempt reform and solidify the eurozone. “If the euro fails, Europe fails,” has been her the mantra ever since, repeated again and again to EU partner and her fellow CDU party members. Europe must exit the debt crisis having grown stronger, she argued. Most of the conflicts that followed over reform demands from Greece in exchange for more billions of aid, were driven by her attempt to create permanent stability for the eurozone through stricter regulatory measures.
And this attempt has been at the core of every European crisis since – the euro crisis, the refugee crisis and its effect on the Schengen zone, as well as in the relations with difficult EU partners from the United Kingdom to Hungary or Poland. At every turn Merkel has stood up against various groups of EU states as well as her own party members who have argued for stricter demands against the respective “problem state.” In her statement at the EU summit on December 17, 2015, Merkel summarized her European political vision as a warning. “In everything we do, we must consider both the cohesion of the European Union and our common responsibility for Europe and for our values,” she said.
But still Merkel is not really thought of as being strongly European. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, for Merkel, who grew up in East Germany, the European project never inspired the same heart-felt passion as it did in West German Helmut Kohl. Her speeches on Europe have always sounded colder and less empathetic. And yet, she has repeatedly stressed that the only chance the EU and Germany have to succeed in maintaining their way of life in the face of both globalization and demographic change lies in deeper European integration.
It is often overlooked that this was a steep learning curve for Merkel, who took office in 2005. After all, it was the first Berlin Grand coalition that “rescued” the Lisbon Treaty following failed referenda on a European constitution in both France and the Netherlands: during Germany’s 2007 EU Council presidency, Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier fought against the apathy of numerous EU partners. Back then, Merkel allowed herself a modicum of pathos, declaring, “Europa ist zu seinem Glück vereint,” which is a difficult phrase to translate but means “Europe is united toward its own happiness” but also contains a touch of “Luckily, Europe is united” – in a way that works well in German. This exact phrase she has repeated dozens of times since.
Second, supporters of EU integration long discredited Merkel’s political engagement on the European stage. Why? Because the chancellor had pursued intergovernmental agreements to address the financial crisis instead of relying on the so-called “community method” of decision-making – which annoyed both the EU Commission and the EU Parliament, who felt they were being sidestepped. Yet these measures were meant to be “integrationalist.” Both Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble saw it as the necessary approach in the crisis, in order to be able to reach some agreement on strengthened cooperation between certain European states. After all, the conservative UK government had for years prevented far-reaching agreements among the 28 EU states, most recently in the Fiscal Compact; and the socialist French government, fearing another failed referendum, had at every turn blocked any step that would require treaty changes.
Thirdly, since new integration measures seemed unrealistic at the time, one did not necessarily aspire to be a “great European” politician. After the big projects, from the euro to Schengen to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has now entered a phase in which it must focus on correcting the construction errors of these big projects. And this requires cool-headed mechanics and political therapists more than visionaries. Considering the rifts redeveloping between east and west, north and south, Europe has to rediscover the essence that brings them all together in this big, European project. Further important steps toward integration, in contrast, seem increasingly difficult, which is why the title of a “great European” is rarely bestowed anymore. For Merkel, being a “good European” today does not mean relentlessly pursuing further integration, but rather ensuring that the EU continues to hold together at all.
Fourth, Merkel has been unable to overcome the impression of a German unilateralism, especially in the refugee crisis – largely due to a failure of communication. Accepting Syrian refugees stranded at Budapest’s Keleti train station into Germany in early September 2015 was meant to relieve the burden on Austria and Hungary. Instead Merkel was seen to be “inviting in refugees” and “opening the borders” – and this interpretation went largely uncorrected for a long time. In consequence, the German government is being held responsible by many for current tensions across the EU. However, the guiding motivation during the refugee crisis for Merkel, as well as for Schäuble and Steinmeier, was to find a common European solution to a common European problem.
Greece and the Euro Crisis
The Greek crisis was the first test case for this position in 2015 – one which may repeat itself in 2016. Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras’ assumption of office marked the end of decades-long solidarity of at least one of the two major European party families with the government in Athens. Now the euro partner countries faced a fundamental question: Which is more important – enforcing the rules or the exit of a country from the currency union?
This fight continued to escalate until July 2015. Then, of all people, Finance Minister Schäuble – a politician often described by the media as “the last staunch European in the German government” – was accused of wanting to throw Greece out of the euro if necessary, thereby fracturing the eurozone. Indeed a working-paper prepared by the finance ministry did include the option of a temporary euro exit should Tsipras fail to enact the required reforms. In the closing session of the European finance ministers’ meeting in Brussels on July 11, this option appeared to find broad support in the euro group. Germany was in no way isolated in this position. The majority of the European finance ministers, annoyed with Athens, believed that a Grexit from the eurozone was a possible option.
At the decisive EU summit immediately following that meeting, Chancellor Merkel and French President François Hollande ensured an agreement that followed not only “European” logic but also the tradition of Franco-German compromise. Once Tsipras had promised to bend to the reform measures demanded by its international creditors, Merkel accepted Greece’s retention in the eurozone. And this she did though it was already clear that a solid core of 63 representatives within her own party would vote against the billion-euro rescue package when it came before the Bundestag and that she would face strong opposition from within her party.
There are two pivotal reasons, why Merkel came to the conclusion to keep the eurozone together. First, she shared Hollande’s impression that the expulsion of any eurozone country could be interpreted by speculators as a signal of the currency’s demise. Second, the chancellor would not allow the Franco-German axis to crumble. Hollande had already stiffened his resolve to give Tsipras another chance, largely for party reasons. It was not the first time that Merkel had underscored her fundamental belief that while agreements between France and Germany were, in a Europe of 28 states, no longer singularly decisive, they were still essential.
Refugees and the Schengen Zone
Merkel’s EU priorities became even more obvious with the refugee crisis, a topic which since has dominated German politics. To understand this, we need to go back a few months to at least April 2015. An EU summit that month laid down the following principle: rescue of boat refugees would be given priority over better protection of the EU’s external borders. At the same time, the countries agreed on a common policy to target human smugglers. This decision followed public outrage after nearly 900 refugees drowned when their boat sank off the Libyan coast. Thus the 28 EU heads of state and government finally decided to “Europeanize” the refugee crisis after having for years left (Germany included) the heavy burdens to external Schengen states like Greece and Italy.
Those “course corrections” have been the guiding line for Merkel ever since, even as the numbers of refugees arriving via the so-called Balkan route after July continued to climb and countries like Hungary blamed Germany for “welcoming policies” they deemed too open. Merkel, who was accused of being responsible for the growing number of refugees (by talking selfies with refugees), refutes the claim. A quick look at the statistics, she has argued, shows that the rise in refugee arrivals via the Balkan route had in reality begun long before. Germany’s “pull” has less to do with Merkel than with the country’s size, economic strength, solid social benefits, low unemployment, its relative familiarity, and perhaps also the warm reception exhibited first by Munich’s residents. And on top of all that there is Germany’s generous asylum law, anchored in the constitution, an exceptional situation neither CDU, CSU, nor SPD leaders were prepared to tackle.
Later the chancellor often assumed Schäuble’s phrasing that the refugee crisis was an almost inevitable German “rendezvous” with globalization. Germanyʼs experience with globalization had until now been restricted to exports and vacations. Now it is experiencing giant refugee movements from countries in Europeʼs immediate neighborhood. Merkel has also pointed out that the thousands of Europeans who have gone to fight with the so-called Islamic State and thus further destabilize Syria and Iraq, bestows upon Europe a unique responsibility to accept Syrian refugees.
No Unilateralism Allowed
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s attempt to unilaterally respond to the growing number of refugees and migrants by building a fence on his external borders was rejected early and decisively by Merkel. Instead, she organized a Balkan conference in cooperation with the EU Commission to encourage affected states along the refugee route to develop common strategies and responses. Western Balkan states, especially those who had finally attained the status of EU candidate countries, could once again be drawn into old conflicts, she worried, and risk dangerous escalation as a result of the refugee chaos.
Merkel rebuffed CSU demands both to set a maximum limit for refugees or to block them from entry at the German-Austrian border. She asked for, and received, support for her positions both at the national CDU party convention and again at the CDU leadership meeting at the beginning of January. The chancellor has also forced through a bundle of domestic measures to decrease the country’s “pull” and regulate the influx of migrants, to lower incentives for migrants, ease deportation, and ultimately to regain a clear picture of the people entering the country. But basically Merkel stood her ground in the face of heavy opposition, arguing that the number of refugees could only be achieved at the European level, in cooperation with Turkey and the countries of origin, neither nationally nor unilaterally.
Why did she stand firm? Merkel was convinced that unilateral action by Germany – the country most affected by the crisis – would shatter the entire EU. “In these times, I am convinced that Germany, the economically strongest European country, must accept its unique responsibility and that the protection and preservation of the achievements of European integration are often especially dependent upon our country. The two most important things for me are our open internal borders and our common currency,” she said in a speech on December 17, 2015. The preservation of these accomplishments was deeply in Germanyʼs self-interest, she argued. “Thus, we cannot succumb to the temptation of falling back into nationalistic action, especially in difficult times. Walling ourselves off is not a reasonable option in the 21st century.”
Because her EU partners could neither enact the agreements on the construction of registration and distribution centers (“hotspots”) in Italy and Greece nor redistribute even the 160,000 Syrian refugees that had been suggested – and because domestic criticism rose in the wake of mass sexual assaults which took place in Cologne on New Year’s Eve, Merkel was forced to turn up the pressure. On January 11 she again stressed that the collapse of passport-free travel in the Schengen zone and a return to national border controls would carry grave consequences for the entire EU. “The euro and freedom of movement across borders are inextricably tied together,” she stressed. Schäuble, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and even Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi also warned that cohesion of the entire EU was at risk.
Despite growing pressure from domestic opinion polls, Merkel withstood demands from Bavaria and her own party leaders to close the German-Austrian border to refugees, on the grounds that the Dublin regulations require asylum seekers to file in their Schengen state of entry, be it Greece or, at the very least, Austria. Her main concern has been the negative domino effect such a border closing would unleash. Germany as the largest and most central European economy must assume additional responsibility for the maintenance of freedom of movement in the European internal market, she stressed. At the same time, she made clear to her European partners that without their solidarity, Germany would eventually be forced to act unilaterally out of national self-interest, but in any case would be the last to revert to national solutions. Early in 2016, the German government also demonstrated its willing to dig deep into their own pockets for the cause: Its pledges at the Syria Donors Conference in London on February 4 made Berlin the largest financial supporter of the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and the World Food Program in the Middle East.
Merkelʼs motto is similar to her euro crisis credo: Her predecessors were celebrated for European “fair-weather projects” like Schengen to Dublin; now is the time to cement the rules giving these castles in the sky a firm foundation.
No Brexit, No Criticism of Poland and Hungary
Merkelʼs insistence on maintaining EU unity is related, however, to the danger of erosion on the unionʼs other shores. Thus she has shown more sympathy for Britain’s demands for reorganization of its relations with the EU than most of its other European partners. “Germany of course wishes that the United Kingdom permanently remains an active partner in a strong European Union,” Merkel stressed on December 17, again with a view of the big picture. “Because not only the UK itself profits from its membership; the European Union as a whole profits too, as it would slide significantly in importance without the UK,” she warned, pointing to its 15-percent share of the EU economy and its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. “In our times this is of utmost importance, times in which Europe faces international demands as never before.”
As with the Schengen zone and the euro, Merkel clearly argues from a position of national self-interest. The UK, she argues, pursues goals similar to Germany’s in many European policy areas, whereby “the country is a natural ally on many issues.” In other words, Merkel needs London as a partner in order to achieve goals like increased growth and competitiveness, “because Europe must stand on a solid economic foundation in order to overcome all other challenges it faces.”
We often overlook that Merkel proves herself the “last European” not only when the EU threatens to fall apart, but also in her defense of the very things making Europe Europe. She exerts more effort than most to ensure that basic regulations and common values are adhered to. Merkel – unlike Cameron – always addresses human rights concerns, even during state visits to China. On most trips abroad, she insists upon holding press conferences open even to critical questions. And whenever possible, she encourages her guests in Berlin to call their own press conferences, which she views as an essential element of both a free press and democratic debate. Her reasoning: The EU cannot spread its values throughout the world unless it actively lives them, too.
It is this position which makes conflicts with EU partners like Hungary or Poland particularly difficult, countries whose rightist-nationalist governments have been accused of violating constitutional principles. Merkel has, however, thus far managed to restrain from openly criticizing Budapest or Warsaw too harshly. This has less to do with the fact that Merkel’s East German roots help her better understand the political and psychological cleavages still separating former communist Eastern Bloc states even 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more to do with Merkelʼs insistence – clearly in Germany’s self-interest – that such constitutional debates are led by the EU Commission and not individual EU states. The EU increases stability on the continent exactly because such differences are no longer bilateral concerns. To this end, she consciously refrained from criticizing Poland’s new PiS government, instead stressing her desire to cooperate.
More Europe!
Merkel sees only one possible and worthwhile goal: in the end, there must be more and not less Europe. The community needs to create a body of laws suitable to future challenges. This is neither altruistic nor blind EU enthusiasm. Here, too, German and European interests overlap. “No European country profits from these achievements as much as we do nor needs them as much as we do, simply as a matter of geography,” she said on December 17, referring to the euro and the Schengen zone. And considering growing European skepticism, she reminds us how much has truly been accomplished in the last few decades. “Instead of living in a Europe of war and bondage, we find ourselves today in a Europe of peace, freedom, prosperity, and good neighbors, and this is nothing to be taken for granted,” she admonished.
“It is the result of European politics that have again and again required delicate negotiations, intensive effort, a willingness and ability to compromise, as well as mutual solidarity. This is in my view more important than ever, seeing as we live in times in which we must defend our values and interests in the face of fierce global competition. … No country alone can succeed in securing its citizens prosperous and peaceful lives.” Considering the apathy across the rest of Europe, the CSU’s regionalism, and nationalist conservative strains in her own CDU, this sounds like the avowal of the “last European.” •
